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This paper argues that there are two distinct kinds of senses, immediate
senses and reflective senses. Immediate senses are what we are immediately
aware of when we are in an intentional mental state, while reflective senses
are what we understand of an intentional mental state’s (putative) referent
upon reflection. I suggest an account of immediate and reflective senses that
is based on the phenomenal intentionality theory, a theory of intentionality
in terms of phenomenal consciousness. My focus is on the immediate and
reflective senses of thoughts and the concepts they involve, but it also
applies to other mental instances of intentionality.
1 Introduction
It is sometimes held that thoughts and other intentional mental states have two
distinct semantic features: sense and reference, where reference is a matter of
picking out or targeting specific items and sense is a matter of how subjects
conceive of these items. While I think this is more or less the right picture, I
want to suggest that we need to make a further distinction between two different
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kinds of senses: immediate senses, which are what we are immediately aware
of in having an intentional mental state, and reflective senses, which are what
we understand of an intentional mental state’s (putative) referent upon reflection.
This paper has two aims: The first is to argue that thoughts and other mental
states have immediate and reflective senses, and that, in many cases, they are
distinct. The second is to suggest that the phenomenal intentionality theory, a
theory of intentionality based on phenomenal consciousness, provides the best
account of immediate and reflective senses.1
2 Two Kinds of Senses
This paper is concerned with the semantic features of mental states. Although my
claims are meant to apply to various kinds of mental states, my main arguments
focus on the case of thoughts, the mental states we are in when we do what we
commonly call “thinking.” Thoughts include occurrent states such as judgments
and occurrent desires (desires we are currently entertaining), but not perceptual
experiences or standing states, such as beliefs we are not currently entertaining.
Thoughts seem to “say” or represent something, target things in the world, and
be assessable for truth and accuracy. For example, a thought might represent
that Eleni is intelligent, target Eleni herself, and be true just in case Eleni is in
fact intelligent.
In discussing semantic features, it is useful to assume a distinction between
semantic features and the items that have them, which are the vehicles of
representation, or representations, for short. As I am using the terms, mental
states such as thoughts, beliefs, desires, and many perceptual states are examples
of representations. It is also useful to assume that most thoughts are complex in
1Many of the ideas in this paper are discussed in greater detail in chapter 7 of Mendelovici
2018.
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that they are composed of other representations, which I will call concepts.2
For example, a thought that cats have tails might be partly composed of the
concept cat, which might also be involved in other thoughts, such as the thought
that Mitten is a cat.
Roughly following Frege (1948), thoughts and other representations are
sometimes taken to have two kinds of semantic features: sense and reference. On
one intuitive way of characterizing this distinction, a representation’s referent is
what it picks out, singles out, or refers to, while its sense is the way in which
this (putative) referent is conceived. While Frege argued that senses are publicly
available abstract entities that determine reference, on my use of the term “sense,”
I will not assume that senses have any of these features. A representation’s sense
is merely how its subject conceives of its (putative) referent.
One gloss on Frege’s arguments for the existence of senses is that we need
them in order to account for semantic differences that are not differences in
reference. For example, the thought that Hesperus is bright and the thought
that Phosphorus is bright involve all the same referents but differ in meaning or
“cognitive significance.” We can account for this difference by saying that the
two thoughts contain two distinct concepts, Hesperus and Phosphorus, with
different senses. The sense of Hesperus is <the first star visible in the evening
sky>, while the sense of Phosphorus is <the last star visible in the morning
sky>. The two concepts pick out the same thing but involve two different ways
of conceiving of it.
My contention is that, while this is more or less the right picture, we need to
make a further distinction between two different kinds of sense corresponding
to two different ways of understanding what it is to conceive of a (putative)
referent in a certain way. One way of understanding the notion of conceiving of
2This is to assume something like a language of thought (see Fodor 1975).
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a (putative) referent is as capturing what is in some sense “before one’s mind”
when we use a concept or have a thought. This is what is running through our
minds, what is immediately available to us, or what we are aware of in using
a representation. Call this a representation’s immediate sense. To say that
<the first star visible in the evening sky> is the immediate sense of Hesperus
is to say that when we use the concept Hesperus, the content <the first star
visible in the evening sky> is running through our minds.
Another way of understanding the notion of conceiving of a referent is as
capturing our reflective intuitive understanding of a referent, an understanding
we might retrieve upon brief or prolonged reflection. Call this a representation’s
reflective sense. To say that <the first star visible in the evening sky> is the
reflective sense of Hesperus is to say that when we use the concept Hesperus,
the content <the first star visible in the evening sky> is available upon sufficient
reflection of the right sort. For instance, if we were to think <Hesperus is
bright>, upon sufficient reflection we should be able to further elucidate our
thought as <the first star visible in the evening sky is bright>, accepting this as
what we meant, intended, or targeted by the first thought.
3 A Distinction with a Difference
So far I have merely introduced the notions of immediate and reflective senses.
In this section, I argue that there are immediate and reflective senses and that
they are distinct. I do so by considering a variety of examples, focusing mainly
on concepts, and arguing that they involve two distinct things respectively
answering to the notions of immediate and reflective senses.3
3We might also argue for the distinctness of immediate and reflective senses in a way
that parallels our gloss on Frege’s argument for the existence of senses: We need immediate
senses that are distinct from reflective senses in order to account for differences that are not
differences in either reflective senses or referents. For example, suppose that we reflectively
understand a bachelor as an unmarried man. The thought that John is a bachelor and the
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Number concepts. My first example is adapted from David Bourget’s (2017)
discussion of number concepts. When we think about numbers, especially large
numbers, we are not immediately aware of the numbers themselves but rather of
the numerals that stand for them, perhaps in addition to a rough ballpark sense
of their magnitudes. Bourget offers a couple of reasons to think this: First, as
far as what is in our immediate awareness is concerned, numerals like “8,346,182”
could stand for entirely different numbers than they in fact stand for. Second,
the same arithmetical equation can seem more or less obvious depending on the
notation used to symbolize it. For example, 70× 100 = 7000 is obvious when
presented in decimal notation but less obvious when presented in binary notion
(1000110 × 1100100 = 1101101011000). All this suggests that the immediate
senses of most of our number concepts are not numbers but something more like
numerals.
However, our reflective understanding of numbers goes beyond what’s in our
immediate awareness. There are different possible views of exactly what this
understanding consists in. Perhaps we understand numbers as multiplicities,
abstract entities with various features, whatever entities satisfy certains axioms,
something to do with counting or the succession relation, or even sui generis
entities.
If all this is right, then our number concepts have distinct immediate and
reflective senses. Their immediate senses are something like numerals, while their
reflective senses encompass a richer understanding, such as that of a multiplicity
thought that John is an unmarried man involve the same reflective senses and referents but are
different thoughts. We can account for this difference by saying that the two thoughts involve
two distinct concepts, bachelor and unmarried man, with distinct immediate senses. The
difference between the two thoughts lies in what we are immediately aware of in having them.
One might object that the difference between the two thoughts can be accounted for by the
different vehicles they involve. While the two thoughts do involve different vehicles, this does
not fully account for the difference between them because the difference is a semantic difference,
a difference in what we are thinking. In order to account for this semantic difference, we need
to posit a difference in the semantic features involved in these cases. (See also Mendelovici
2010: §13.4, for related discussion of how distinguishing between immediate and reflective
senses best resolves the paradox of analysis.)
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or an abstract object.
Stipulated concepts. Suppose that, while developing a philosophical ar-
gument, you stipulate <let Ent = physicalism is committed to the a priori
entailment of the phenomenal facts by the physical facts>. You thereby acquire
a new concept, Ent, which you can use in your further deliberations.
When you have a thought involving Ent, <physicalism is committed to
the a priori entailment of the phenomenal facts by the physical facts> is not
running through your head in its entirety. Instead, what is running through your
head—call it <Ent>—might consist in purely verbal or perceptual imagery of
the word “Ent,” a schematic, gist-like, or partial understanding of <physicalism
is committed to the a priori entailment of the phenomenal facts by the physical
facts>, or perhaps a new simple or sui generis content. Different people or
the same people on different occasions might enjoy different immediate senses
associated with the concept Ent.
<Ent>’s lack of detail and complexity is what makes your stipulation useful
to you, lessening your cognitive load by allowing you to use a simpler content
to stand for one that is more complex. In the extreme case, these kinds of
stipulations allow you to engage in purely formal reasoning about complex,
substantive issues, just as we can reason about large numbers by manipulating
numerals that stand for them.
At the same time, your reflective understanding of the target of Ent is
the more complex <physicalism is committed to the a priori entailment of the
phenomenal facts by the physical facts>. This is what you stipulated <Ent> is to
stand for, and it can be easily retrieved by you at any point in your deliberations.
If all this is right, then Ent’s immediate sense is <Ent>, whatever that ends
up being, while its reflective sense is <physicalism is committed to the a priori
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entailment of the phenomenal facts by the physical facts>. The same holds in
other cases of stipulated concepts.
Concepts with definitions. Similar points hold for non-stipulated concepts
that have definitions, such as the concepts grandmother, odd number, and
supervenience. These concepts’ definitions arguably capture our reflective
understanding of their targets, but they do not run through our heads every time
we use the concepts. For example, when you think <three is an odd number>,
you are not immediately aware of any definition of an odd number—for instance,
you are not immediate aware of the property of being divisible or the number
two. Likewise, when you think <the mental supervenes on the physical>, you are
not immediately aware of possible worlds or other elements in supervenience’s
definition.
Although a defined concept’s definition is not usually running through your
mind when you use it, there is something running through your mind, so defined
concepts also have immediate senses. In the case of supervenience, for example,
this immediate sense might be or involve some verbal or perceptual imagery
(e.g., the word “supervenience” or mental imagery of one item above another),
a schematic, gist-like, or partial grasp of the definition of supervenience (e.g.,
an abstract idea of some kind of logical dependence), or simple or sui generis
contents, not understandable in terms of other contents (e.g., as far as our
immediate understanding of supervenience is concerned, supervenience might
be a simple or sui generis relation, its own kind of thing). As in the case of
concepts with stipulated definitions, different people or the same people on
different occasions might enjoy different immediate senses associated with the
concept supervenience.
If all this is right, then concepts with definitions have immediate and reflective
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senses, and they are usually distinct.
Prototype, exemplar, and theory concepts. Many everyday concepts like
table and chair arguably do not have definitions. One reason to think this is
that it is notoriously difficult to produce satisfactory definitions for such concepts.
Another reason is that there is a host of empirical findings suggesting that most
concepts do not have a definitional structure.4
Alternative views of such concepts take them to represent or involve the
representation of prototypes, which are (perhaps weighted) lists of features
that members of a category tend to have or that are predictive of belonging to a
category (Rosch 1975, Rosch and Mervis 1975) sets of exemplars, which are
individual items or subcategories that fall under a category (Medin and Schaffer
1978, Brooks 1978) or theories about a category (Murphy and Medin 1985,
Carey 1985, Gopnik and Wellman 1994).
If the prototype, exemplar, or theory theories are right about certain concepts,
then our reflective understanding of the categories they pick out likely consists in
the information stored in our prototypes, exemplars, or theories of the category,
respectively. For example, how we conceive of the target of our concept bird
upon reflection might be a matter of our bird prototype, our stored exemplars of
birds, or our theoretical information about birds, depending on the theory. But
when we use the concept bird, we are not immediately aware of a bird prototype,
multiple exemplars of birds, or theories of birds. Still, there is something running
through our minds when we think about birds. This might be a matter of
verbal imagery corresponding to the word “bird”; mental imagery of a bird; a
schematic, gist-like, or partial understanding of our prototypes, exemplars, or
the information in our theories; or a simple or sui generis content.5
4For an overview, see Murphy 2004.
5There is an important caveat: Some aspects or parts of the prototypes, sets of exemplars,
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If all this is right, then concepts with an exemplar, prototype, or theory
structure have distinct immediate and reflective senses. What we are immediately
aware of in using such concepts differs from our reflective understanding of their
targets.
Perceptual experiences. In many perceptual experiences, immediate and
reflective senses do not come apart. Many of the targets of perceptual experience
are presented to us just as we reflectively understand them. Suppose you
visually experience something as having a specific shape for which you have no
corresponding concept. Your entire grasp of the nature of the shape is in some
sense immediately before your mind’s eye. What you immediately understand
of the shape is the same as what you reflectively understand of it. So, the
experience’s immediate sense is the same as its reflective sense.6
But there are two kinds of cases in which the immediate and reflective senses
of a perceptual experience can come apart. The first involves the representation
of high-level properties, like the properties of being a cat or a computer (see Siegel
2005). Suppose you see a computer as a computer. And suppose further that
your reflective understanding of computers includes a definition, prototype, set of
exemplars, or theory of computers. When you see the computer as a computer,
you are not immediately aware of such definitions, prototypes, exemplars, or
theories. But, at the same time, you are immediately aware of more than just
the low-level features that your experience represents. In seeing the computer as
or theories that are associated with a given concept might not be available upon reflection but
might nonetheless do other work that would justify their inclusion in a concept’s prototype,
set of exemplars, or theory. For instance, they might only be involved in categorization—for
example, we might categorize objects as dogs based partly on their having a certain dog smell,
but it might not be part of our reflective understanding of dogs that they have such a smell.
Indeed, it is even possible for no parts of a concept’s prototype, set of exemplars, or theory
to constitute our reflective understanding of its target. This might be the case with concepts
with definitions that nonetheless have associated prototypes, exemplars, or theories, such as
the concept grandmother.
6See also Bourget’s (2017) example of perfectly grasping the shape of a line drawing.
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a computer, you might be aware of verbal imagery corresponding to the word
“computer,” a generic or schematic image of a computer, a gist-like or schematic
understanding of your reflective conception of computers, or a simple or sui
generis content. Something similar holds in other cases of high-level property
representation in perception. If this is right, then the immediate and reflective
senses of perceptual representations of high-level properties differ.
Immediate and reflective senses also come apart when we have a conceptual
understanding of low-level features represented in perception that goes beyond
our perceptual grasp of those features. For example, suppose you perceptually
experience a square. Your reflective conceptual grasp of squareness might involve
a definition of a square as a closed plane figure with four sides of equal length that
meet at right angles. Your experience, however, does not involve an immediate
awareness of this definition. What you are immediately aware of is a particular
experienced shape, perhaps together with verbal or perceptual imagery, or some
additional gist-like appreciation of squareness.
In some cases, an experience’s immediate sense can be in tension with its
reflective sense. Suppose that your color experiences represent primitive colors,
while your color concepts represent dispositions to cause color experiences. Sup-
pose now that you experience an apple as red. You are immediately perceptually
aware of primitive redness. However, what you understand upon reflection is a
disposition to cause experiences of redness. Your experience’s immediate sense is
<primitive redness>, but its reflective sense is <disposition to cause experiences
of primitive redness>.7
In summary, the immediate senses of many perceptual experiences are the
same as their reflective senses. In such cases, we are immediately aware of exactly
7Suppose that objects have dispositions to cause color experiences but do not have primitive
colors. Then your experience is both accurate with respect to its reflective sense and inaccurate
with respect to its immediate sense. For further discussion, see also Mendelovici 2018: Appendix
D.
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what constitutes our reflective understanding of a representation’s referent. In
other cases, however, immediate senses and reflective senses come apart.
I’ve considered various concepts and other representations and argued that
they have immediate and reflective senses. We’ve seen that in the case of
concepts and perceptual representations that involve something like a “conceptual”
element, the two kinds of sense come apart. Since thoughts are composed of
concepts, and assuming that the senses of thoughts involve or are a function
of the senses of their constituent concepts, it is reasonable to conclude that
thoughts also have immediate and reflective senses and that these senses often
come apart.8
4 Against Tracking and Functional Role Theo-
ries of Immediate and Reflective Senses
Immediate and reflective senses are semantic features of mental states, so we
might turn to contemporary theories of intentionality for an account of them. In
this section, I will very briefly consider two prominent contemporary theories
of intentionality—tracking and functional role theories—and suggest that their
main ingredients cannot account for either kind of sense. In the next section, I
will consider an alternative theory—the phenomenal intentionality theory—and
argue that its ingredients can.
According to tracking theories, what a representation represents is or is
determined by what it tracks, where tracking is detecting, carrying information
about, or otherwise appropriately corresponding to states of affairs or other items
8It is also possible to argue for the claim in the case of thoughts in much the same way as
I’ve argued for the claim in the case of concepts: through the consideration of various cases.
For example, we might directly argue that the reflective sense of the thought that the mental
supervenes on the physical differs from its immediate sense.
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in the environment. On many tracking theories, the relevant tracking relation is
a causal relation (e.g., Stampe 1977, Dretske 1995, Fodor 1987, Neander 2017),
though on others it is not (Millikan 1984).
One might suggest that we can account for immediate and reflective senses
in terms of tracking relations. The problem with such an account is that, in
many cases, what we track comes apart from how we understand something both
immediately and reflectively. For example, a child’s color concepts might track
various surface reflectance properties or dispositions to affect us in certain ways,
but when she experiences colors, she is only immediately aware of a primitive,
sui generis property of objects. So what her perceptual color representations
track doesn’t match their immediate senses. Her reflective understanding of
colors might also be as of primitive, sui generis properties, so what her color
concepts track doesn’t match her reflective understanding of colors either. If
this is right, the tracking theory cannot account for either kind of sense.9
Let us now consider functional role theories, which state that a mental
state’s content is or is determined by its inferential or other kind of functional
role (see Harman 1987, Block 1986). For example, the representation bachelor
might represent <unmarried man> in virtue of being involved in the following
inferences:
(B1) From judging o is a bachelor, one is likely to judge o is a man.
(B2) From judging o is a bachelor, one is likely to judge o is unmarried.
(B3) From judging o is a man and o is unmarried, one is likely to judge o
is a bachelor.
Unfortunately, functional roles are ill-suited to accounting for immediate
9For objections to tracking theories along these lines, see Mendelovici 2013, 2016, 2018:
ch. 3 and Mendelovici and Bourget forthcoming.
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senses. For example, the concept Ent might be taken to be involved in the
following key inferences:
(E1) From judging Ent, one is likely to judge physicalism is committed
to the a priori entailment of the phenomenal facts by the
physical facts.
(E2) From judging physicalism is committed to the a priori entailment
of the phenomenal facts by the physical facts, one is likely to
judge Ent.
But this pattern of inferences most closely captures Ent’s reflective sense, not
its immediate sense. The problem is that Ent behaves as if it stands for its
stipulated definition—indeed, that is why it can be so useful.10
A functional role approach is more promising as an account of reflective
senses, as illustrated by the case of Ent. However, such an account faces a
challenge, which is a special case of what is sometimes called the “problem of
collateral information” (see Block 1986): Not all of a representation’s inferential
or other functional roles determine its reflective sense. For example, in addition
to (B1)–(B3), bachelor might play the following role:
(B4) From judging o is a bachelor, one is likely to judge o lives alone.
But (B4) does not play a role in determining bachelor’s reflective sense, which,
presumably, is something like <unmarried man>, not <unmarried man who
lives alone>. The functional role approach needs a way of distinguishing the
functional roles that play a role in determining reflective senses from those that
merely capture collateral information we have about a representation’s target.
10I have only considered “short-arm” (Harman 1987) functional role theories, which take
functional roles to be internal roles. “Long-arm” (Harman 1987) functional role theories appeal
to causal or other relations to the environment in addition to internal roles. Including such
relations does not help us accommodate immediate senses, since there are many cases in which
immediate senses do not match anything we are interestingly related to in the environment
(e.g., the case of color representations mentioned earlier). See also Mendelovici 2018: §4.3.
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I will later suggest that an account of reflective senses that invokes both
functional roles and phenomenal consciousness can meet this challenge. For
now, however, I want to suggest that an account of reflective senses in terms of
functional roles alone is incorrect because it neglects the relationship between
immediate and reflective senses.
Reflective senses are available upon reflection. If we were to reflect sufficiently,
they would be immediately available to us, just like immediate senses. This
suggests that a representation’s having a reflective sense is a matter of our
being disposed to bring to mind a particular immediate sense. The immediate
sense need not be the immediate sense of the representation in question but
might instead be the immediate sense of another representation. For example,
Ent’s having the reflective sense <physicalism is committed to the a priori
entailment of the phenomenal facts by the physical facts> is a matter of our
being disposed to retrieve a distinct complex representation with that content
as its immediate sense. All this accords with the phenomenology of retrieval of
reflective senses. Reflective senses, when they are retrieved, seem like the same
kind of thing as immediate senses. Like immediate senses, retrieved reflective
senses are immediately available to us. On this picture, one representation’s
reflective sense is another representation’s immediate sense.11
If this picture of reflective senses is correct, then an account of reflective
senses in terms of functional roles alone is incorrect because it does not make
11I have suggested a picture on which reflective senses are a matter of dispositions to
entertain immediate senses. An alternative picture would take reflective senses to be somehow
inherent in representations themselves. One reason to prefer the dispositional picture is that it
makes better sense of why we need to retrieve our representations’ reflective senses in order to
complete certain tasks. For example, in order to judge whether a necessary God supervenes on
everything, we might need to retrieve the reflective sense of supervenience. Another reason
to prefer the dispositional picture is that it makes better sense of how we can sometimes
fail to retrieve our reflective senses. For example, Gabriel might suddenly find that while he
can entertain the immediate sense of supervenience just as he could before, and, e.g., think
thoughts like <the mental supervenes on the physical>, he is no longer able to unpack the
concept. This would be odd if the reflective sense of supervenience were somehow inherent in
the concept itself. (See also Mendelovici 2010: ch. 10, especially n. 23.)
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reference to immediate senses, aiming instead to account for reflective senses
directly.
5 Accounting for Immediate and Reflective Senses:
The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory
This section outlines an alternative approach to intentionality, the phenomenal
intentionality theory,12 and argues that it has the resources needed to neatly
account for both immediate and reflective senses.
According to the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), there is a
kind of intentionality, phenomenal intentionality, that is nothing over and
above phenomenal consciousness, the “what it’s like” (Nagel 1974) aspect of
mental life, and all other kinds of intentionality are derived from it. Phenomenal
intentionality might be identical to, constituted by, grounded in, or in some other
way nothing over and above phenomenal consciousness, and derived intentionality
might derive from it in various ways.13 For example, a perceptual intentional
state with the content <red square> might be identical to a reddish squarish
phenomenal state, and a concept of redness might derive its content from its
relation to such possible or actual phenomenal intentional states. We can
call contents that are phenomenally represented phenomenal contents and
contents that are derivatively represented derived contents. In the previous
example, the perceptual state has a phenomenal content and the concept has a
12See Loar 2003, Strawson 1994, Siewert 1998, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Horgan and
Graham 2009, Pitt 2004, Farkas 2008, Kriegel 2011, Bourget 2010a, 2010b, Mendelovici 2010,
2018, Bourget and Mendelovici 2016, and Mendelovici and Bourget 2014, forthcoming.
13Phenomenal intentionalists have proposed various derivation mechanisms. For example,
Horgan and Tienson (2002) suggest that wide intentional states are derived from phenomenal
intentional states together with “grounding presuppositions” and facts about the world, Bourget
(2010a) takes non-phenomenal intentional states to derive from phenomenal intentional states
via descriptive reference and other derivation mechanisms, and Kriegel (2011) maintains that




On the face of it, PIT appears to have the right structure to accommodate
both kinds of senses. Let us say that the PIT approach to immediate and
reflective senses is the claim that immediate senses are phenomenal contents and
reflective senses are derived contents.
It is plausible that immediate senses are phenomenally represented. Imme-
diate senses are immediately available to us upon having a thought or other
representational state in the same way that phenomenal characters are typically
available to us upon having a phenomenal experience. This accords with the view
that immediate senses are phenomenal contents. Relatedly, taking immediate
senses to be phenomenal contents goes some way towards explaining why they
are immediately available to us: They are phenomenally conscious.
It is also plausible that reflective senses are derived from phenomenal contents.
In the previous section, I argued that having a reflective sense is a matter of
being disposed to entertain an immediate sense upon reflection. On this picture,
immediate senses are more basic than reflective senses, and reflective senses are
derived from them. If this is right, and if immediate senses are phenomenal
contents, then reflective senses are derived from phenomenal contents, as the
PIT approach claims.
Many details of the PIT approach remain to be worked out. First, since
thoughts have immediate senses, the PIT approach requires that they also
have phenomenal characters and that these phenomenal characters match their
immediate senses. Second, the PIT approach must offer an account of precisely
how reflective senses derive from immediate senses. Third, something must
be said about nonconscious occurrent states, which might be taken to have
immediate senses but no phenomenal characters. In the next three subsections,
I will briefly consider these issues in turn.
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5.1 The Phenomenology of Thought
Since thoughts have immediate senses, the PIT approach requires them to have
phenomenal characters that match their immediate senses. Whether thoughts
have phenomenal characters and of what sort is a hotly debated issue.14 The de-
bate usually focuses on what is sometimes called the cognitive phenomenology
thesis, the thesis that thought has a proprietary and individuative phenomenol-
ogy. Thought has a proprietary phenomenology just in case the phenomenology
of thought is “cognitive,” or non-sensory, i.e., different in kind from the phe-
nomenology of sensory mental states like perceptual experiences and emotions.
Thought has an individuative phenomenology just in case thoughts with dif-
ferent contents have different phenomenal characters and thoughts with different
phenomenal characters have different contents.
For present purposes, we can largely avoid the debate over the cognitive
phenomenology thesis. This is because the kind of phenomenology of thought
required for PIT to account for immediate senses needn’t be proprietary and
it needn’t be individuative in the sense that is least plausible. It need not
be proprietary because as far as what we’ve said about immediate senses is
concerned, immediate senses could be sensory in character. For example, they
might consist in verbal or perceptual imagery, which, quite plausibly, would
only require verbal or perceptual phenomenology. Whether this view is viable
depends on whether verbal and perceptual contents can plausibly capture both
the immediate senses of thoughts and the reflective senses that derive from them.
In other words, it depends on whether we think a kind of empiricism is true of
immediate and reflective senses.15
14Bayne and Montague 2011 for a representative collection of essays.
15See Prinz 2002 for a recent defense of empiricism. Although Prinz combines his empiricism
with a tracking view of intentionality, it can also be quite plausibly combined with the PIT
approach.
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Whether the PIT approach requires the phenomenology of thought to be indi-
viduative depends on how we understand what it is for thought’s phenomenology
to be individuative. We said that thought has an individuative phenomenology
just in case thoughts with different contents have different phenomenal characters
and thoughts with different phenomenal characters have different contents, but
we didn’t specify what are the relevant thought contents. Two different under-
standings of being individuative are relevant to our purposes, one on which we
understand the relevant kind of contents to be reflective senses and one on which
we understand them to be immediate senses. The phenomenology of thought is
individuative-with-respect-to-reflective-senses just in case thoughts with
the same reflective senses have the same phenomenal characters and thoughts
with the same phenomenal characters have the same reflective senses. The phe-
nomenology of thought is individuative-with-respect-to-immediate-senses
just in case thoughts with the same immediate senses have the same phenomenal
characters and thoughts with the same phenomenal characters have the same
immediate senses.
Since the PIT approach takes immediate senses, but not reflective senses, to
arise from phenomenal character alone, it requires the phenomenology of thought
to be individuative-with-respect-to-immediate-senses but does not require it
to be individuative-with-respect-to-reflective-senses. This is arguably a quite
plausible view of the phenomenology of thought. To see this, consider a case
that challenges the view that thought has an individuative phenomenology:
Dimitri and Dimitra have different reflective understandings of what it is to
be a father. For Dimitri, a father is a biological father, whereas for Dimitra,
a father is a person with a male gender identity and a parental role. This
difference in Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts of a father is not always reflected
in the phenomenal characters of their thoughts about fathers, especially when
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questions of biological fatherhood or parental roles are not particularly salient.
When Dimitri and Dimitra think the thoughts they would express with “Marius
is a father,” their thoughts sometimes have the same phenomenal characters.
This is a counterexample to the phenomenology of thought being individuative-
with-respect-to-reflective-senses, since Dimitri and Dimitra’s thoughts have the
same phenomenal characters but different reflective senses. But it need not be
a counterexample to the phenomenology of thought being individuative-with-
respect-to-immediate-senses. If Dimitri and Dimitra’s thoughts have the same
phenomenal characters, then it is quite plausible that Dimitri and Dimitra
are immediately aware of the same thing and so that their thoughts have the
same immediate senses. This example shows that relatively deep theoretical
differences of the sort exemplified by Dimitri and Dimitra make a difference for
reflective senses but they need not make a difference for phenomenal characters
or immediate senses. This suggests that the phenomenology of thought is
individuative-with-respect-to-immediate-senses, as required by the PIT approach,
but not individuative-with-respect-to-reflective-senses.
In summary, although the PIT approach to immediate and reflective senses
requires there to be a phenomenology of thought, this requirement is not as
controversial as it might seem, since the phenomenology of thought need not be
proprietary or individuative-with-respect-to-reflective-senses. Even opponents of
the cognitive phenomenology thesis might agree that thoughts have the kind of
phenomenology required.
The PIT approach requires not just that thoughts have phenomenal characters
but also that their phenomenal characters can plausibly be identified with their
immediate senses. In many cases, such an identification is not implausible. For
example, Ent’s immediate sense might simply be a verbal representation of the
word “Ent” together with a gist-like awareness of physicalism’s commitment to
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a priori entailment, and its phenomenal character might involve some verbal
phenomenology of the word “Ent” and a gist-like cognitive phenomenal character.
Similarly, a concept of a large number might have an immediate sense consisting
of an auditory or visual depiction of the numeral that stands for it and a matching
auditory or visual phenomenal character.
Something similar holds in other cases. While it might be unclear what exactly
are the immediate senses of representations like bird and supervenience, it is
not implausible that they match their phenomenal characters in the way required.
Immediate senses might consist in verbal or perceptual imagery, gists or aspects
of reflective senses, or primitive or sui generis contents. This allows for a variety
of views of the phenomenal character of any given representation on which it
matches its immediate sense: First, the representation might have a verbal
immediate sense and a matching verbal phenomenology (e.g., supervenience
might have the word “supervenience” as its immediate sense and a matching
quasi-auditory verbal phenomenal character). Second, the representation might
have a perceptual immediate sense and a matching perceptual phenomenology
(e.g., supervenience might have an immediate sense consisting in mental
imagery of one item above another and a matching visual phenomenal character).
Third, the representation might have a simple or sui generis immediate sense and
a matching simple or sui generis phenomenal character (e.g., supervenience
might have a simple or sui generis immediate sense, not understandable in terms
of any other contents, and a matching simple or sui generis supervenience-ish
phenomenal character). Fourth, the representation might have an immediate
sense that is a component or aspect of its reflective sense (which might be a
matter of perceptual and verbal imagery, simple or sui generis components, or
something else) and a matching phenomenal character that is a component of the
phenomenal character corresponding to its reflective sense (e.g., supervenience
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might have the immediate sense <no difference without a difference>, where
this is a matter of verbal, or simple or sui generis contents, and a phenomenal
character consisting in matching perceptual, verbal, or simple or sui generis
phenomenal characters). Finally, the representation might have an immediate
sense consisting of a schematic or gist-like understanding of at least some aspects
of its reflective sense and a similarly schematic or gist-like phenomenal character
(e.g., supervenience might have an unarticulated or gist-like grasp of its
definition as its immediate sense and a similarly gist-like phenomenal character).
These options can be combined in various ways. First, a single representation
might have an immediate sense that is a combination of the above options and
a similarly combined phenomenal character. For example, supervenience’s
immediate sense and phenomenal character might contain both verbal and sui
generis components. Second, different representations might have different kinds
of immediate senses and phenomenal characters. Perhaps bird’s immediate
sense and phenomenal character consist in perceptual imagery and perceptual
phenomenal character, respectively, but knowledge’s immediate sense and phe-
nomenal character are sui generis. Third, different subjects or the same subject
on different occasions might have representations with different immediate senses
and phenomenal characters, even if they have the same reflective senses—just
like Dimitri and Dimitra.16
One potentially attractive view is that the immediate senses and phenomenal
characters of many representations are both simple, in that they do not involve
component parts, and gist-like, in that they involve hints of at least some aspects
of their reflective senses. This might be possible if immediate senses (phenomenal
characters) are internally unstructured, in that they do not involve proper
parts that are also immediate senses (phenomenal characters), and at the same
16For further discussion, see Mendelovici 2018: §7.2.4.
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time externally structured, in that they differ from various other actual or
possible immediate senses (phenomenal characters) along various dimensions.17
We can think of such externally structured immediate senses (phenomenal
characters) as being located in multidimensional spaces of immediate senses
(phenomenal characters) organized by similarity.
For example, the immediate senses (phenomenal characters) of perceptual
color representations are arguably internally unstructured: they do not have
or decompose into proper parts that are also immediate senses (phenomenal
characters). For example, the phenomenal character of an experience of green
arguably isn’t composed of phenomenal characters corresponding to particular
hues, saturations, brightnesses, or distinct full-fledged colors.18 But it is ex-
ternally structured: It differs from the phenomenal characters of other color
experiences with respect to hue, saturation, and brightness. The same arguably
holds for the experience’s immediate sense.
More speculatively, perhaps the immediate senses (phenomenal characters)
of some concepts can be located in the same multidimensional spaces as their
reflective senses (their reflective sense’s phenomenal characters). For instance,
perhaps the immediate sense of knowledge has some features in common with
those of justification and belief, and its similarity to those immediate senses
accounts for the sense we have that the immediate sense of knowledge is a
gist-like grasp of at least some components of its reflective sense. All this is
compatible with the immediate sense of knowledge being internally simple—it
might not have immediate senses such as <belief> and <justification> as parts,
in the same way that the immediate senses of perceptual color representations do
not have immediate senses corresponding to hues, saturations, and brightnesses
as parts. The same arguably holds for the concept’s phenomenal character.
17This terminology comes from Chalmers 2016.
18See Roelofs 2014 for arguments to the contrary and Mendelovici 2019 for discussion.
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My preferred view of the immediate senses and phenomenal characters of
most concepts is that they are simple and gist-like in this way, perhaps also
in some cases involving a verbal component and some mental imagery. This
accords with the phenomenology of consciously entertaining immediate senses.
When we think <the mental supervenes on the physical>, we seem to have both
a grasp of supervenience as its own unique thing as well an inarticulate glimpse
of its reflective sense. In any case, my main claims are compatible with other
views of the immediate senses and phenomenal characters of concepts and other
representations.
5.2 How reflective senses derive from phenomenal con-
tents
The PIT approach takes reflective senses to derive from phenomenal contents.
But how exactly does this derivation work?
In Section 4, I suggested that a representation’s reflective sense is a matter of
the immediate senses we are disposed to retrieve upon reflection. For example,
upon reflection of <Ent>, we are disposed to retrieve the immediate sense
<physicalism is committed to the a priori entailment of the phenomenal facts
by the physical facts>, which is Ent’s reflective sense. This suggests a way
in which reflective senses derive from phenomenal contents: A representation’s
reflective sense derives from the phenomenally represented immediate senses we
are disposed to retrieve upon reflection of its immediate sense.
The central challenge for such an account of reflective senses is to make
sense of what it is for an immediate sense to be retrieved upon reflection. This
cannot just be a matter of being disposed to entertain it after entertaining the
representation in question’s immediate sense, since we might be similarly disposed
to entertain immediate senses that are not relevant to determining reflective
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senses. For example, upon entertaining the immediate sense <bachelor>, we
might be disposed to entertain immediate senses such as <unmarried man>,
<lives alone>, and <bachelorette>, but only the first of these is bachelor’s
reflective sense.
The challenge is analogous to the functional role theory’s problem of collateral
information discussed in §4. The situation, however, is importantly different for
the PIT approach than for a functional role approach, since the PIT approach
does not aim to understand reflective senses in entirely non-semantic terms but
instead accepts phenomenal intentional states as part of its explanatory base.
My proposal takes its cue from non-mental cases of derived representation.
Words, signs, and other non-mental items can come to have contents thanks
to antecedently contentful mental states. For example, the word “dog” might
mean <dog> and stop signs might mean <stop> because we take “dog” to mean
<dog> and stop signs to mean <stop>. This taking is at least partly a matter
of our representational states, such as our beliefs, intentions, and stipulations.
I want to suggest that the relation between mental representations and
their reflective senses is similar to the relation between non-mental derived
representations and their contents. Just as we take words and signs to have
certain contents, so too do we take mental representations to have certain
contents beyond their immediate senses. On this proposal, bachelor has the
reflective sense <unmarried man> because we take it to represent <unmarried
man>. This taking is a matter of being disposed to accept <unmarried man>
as equivalent to, what is meant by, or a further elucidation of the immediate
sense of bachelor, <bachelor>. This might involve being disposed to entertain
the immediate sense <unmarried man, that’s the same as a bachelor>, or
<bachelors are just unmarried men>. Such thoughts—call them cashing out
thoughts—say that one content is an elucidation, unpacking, precisification,
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expansion, or more generally a cashing out of another.
In many cases, it takes multiple cashing out thoughts to retrieve a full
elucidation of a representation’s immediate sense. For example, we might be
disposed to have cashing out thoughts relating <bachelor> to <unmarried man>,
<unmarried> to <not married> and <man> to <human male>. Assuming
(probably falsely) that we are not disposed to have cashing out thoughts relating
<not married> and <human male> to further contents, <not married human
male> is what we might call bachelor’s full cashing out. This content reflects
our best understanding of bachelor’s target—it is bachelor’s reflective sense.
My suggestion, then, is that a concept’s reflective sense is its full cashing out.19
This provides a way of solving our analogue of the problem of collateral
information: What singles out <not married human male> and not <unmarried
man who lives alone> as the reflective sense of bachelor is that we are disposed
to have cashing out thoughts specifying that <bachelor> cashes out into <not
married human male> but we are not disposed to have cashing out thoughts
specifying that <bachelor> cashes out into <unmarried man who lives alone>.
This picture of reflective senses is cursory and much more needs to be
said before its viability can be assessed. However, I hope this section has at
least shown in outline how reflective senses might be derived from phenomenal
contents.20
19A representation’s full cashing out is an immediate sense or at least a content specified
by an immediate sense (see Mendelovici 2018: §7.3.1, p. 142). There is good reason to think
that, at least for concepts whose target we claim to somewhat understand, we can reach such
an understanding in terms of immediate senses. If we couldn’t, then we would have no claim
to understanding them. It is an open question, however, what kinds of immediate senses
we will find in a representation’s full cashing out. For instance, we might find perceptual
contents, but we might also find unanalysable non-perceptual contents, perhaps like <good>
or <knowledge>.
20This kind of view is developed in more detail in Mendelovici 2018: ch. 7. Note that there
I employ a definition of “intentionality” on which derived contents, and hence reflective senses,
do not qualify as genuinely intentional contents, though they qualify as representational in a
looser, everyday sense.
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5.3 Nonconscious occurrent states
The third issue for the PIT approach concerns nonconscious occurrent states
that are arguably representational in some sense. Occurrent states are states
that are active, used, or undergone, such as perceptual states or thoughts.
Nonconscious states are mental states that lack phenomenal character. Some
nonconscious occurrent states are arguably representational in some sense, e.g.,
some states involved in language processing or early perceptual processing.
Since nonconscious occurrent representational states are nonconscious, they
presumably lack phenomenal characters, which commits the PIT approach to
saying that they also lack immediate senses. But, since nonconscious occurrent
representational states are occurrent and representational, it seems they should
have immediate senses—when we have such states, their contents should be
immediately available to us or “running through our minds,” even if we are not
consciously aware of them.
Nonconscious occurrent states pose a challenge for PIT in general, not just for
the PIT approach to immediate and reflective senses. Accordingly, the positions
the PIT approach might take towards them correspond to the positions available
to PIT, which are the following: (1) They phenomenally represent their contents
(e.g., Pitt MS , Bourget 2010a, Mendelovici 2018: ch.~8); (2) they derivatively
but not phenomenally represent their contents (e.g., Bourget 2010a, Kriegel
2011); and (3) they do not phenomenally or derivatively represent their contents,
though they might “represent” them in some other sense (e.g., Searle 1990,
Mendelovici 2018: ch.~8).
For the PIT approach, option (1) allows that nonconscious occurrent states
have immediate senses and, if the right dispositions are in place, reflective
senses. One might worry that this option requires that we can have phenomenal
states that we are not introspectively aware of, but, given that there exist many
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phenomenal states that any given individual is not consciously aware of (e.g., the
phenomenal states of other subjects), it is not wholly implausible that our own
heads harbor phenomenal states that are likewise isolated from our introspective
abilities.
Option (2), on which nonconscious occurrent states derivatively represent their
contents, results in the view that nonconscious occurrent states lack immediate
senses but nonetheless have reflective senses. On this view, when a representation
gets used nonconsciously, we are not immediately aware of anything. However,
despite lacking immediate senses, nonconscious occurrent states have reflective
senses, which derive from immediate senses. Since nonconscious occurrent states
lack immediate senses, their reflective senses cannot be derived from their own
immediate senses but must be derived from the immediate senses of other states,
either other states of the same subject or other states of other subjects (as on
Kriegel’s (2011) view). Option (2), however, is not compatible with my view of
reflective senses described above, since my view requires that a representation
with a reflective sense have an immediate sense that can partake in experiences
of cashing out.
For the PIT approach, option (3), on which nonconscious occurrent states
neither phenomenally nor derivatively represent their alleged contents, results in
the view that nonconscious occurrent states lack both immediate and reflective
senses. Of course, they might still have various neural and functional properties,
and they might still track various worldly items. In virtue of these features,
we might even say that they represent, perhaps in a loose or extended sense of
“represent,” one that does not amount to their having immediate or reflective
senses.
Option (3) is arguably the least extreme of the three options. It is very much
in line with what we might consider to be the standard view of nonconscious
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occurrent states: It accepts that such states lack phenomenal characters, that
they have neural and functional properties, that they track various items, and
even that they “represent,” insofar as representation is merely a matter of
their neural, functional, or tracking features. The main potential disagreement
between option (3) and the standard view is presumably over whether the
nonconscious “representation” it allows for amounts to the having of immediate
or reflective senses or whether phenomenal properties are required. In other
words, the main disagreement is over whether the PIT approach itself is true
of phenomenally conscious intentional states—which is something I’ve already
argued for. So, rather than being the most extreme of the three options, the
third option arguably represents the smallest reasonable departure from what
we might take to be the standard view.
Which of the three options the PIT approach should adopt depends in part
on whether there is independent reason to ascribe immediate or reflective senses
to nonconscious occurrent states. My preferred view is a combination of (1)
and (3) on which some nonconscious occurrent states have phenomenal contents,
and hence immediate and perhaps reflective senses, while others have neither
phenomenal nor derived contents, and hence neither immediate nor reflective
senses. For example, high-level states involved in nonconscious problem solving
might have immediate senses we are not consciously aware of, while states in
early visual processing might have neither immediate nor reflective senses.21
6 Conclusion
I have argued that there are immediate and reflective senses and that the two
senses come apart in almost all cases of thought and in many cases of perceptual
21For more details, see Mendelovici 2018: §8.4. Note that there “nonconscious states” is
used to pick out mental states that are not phenomenally conscious, while here it is used to
pick out mental states that we are not consciously aware of.
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representation. I explored various ways we might try to account for immediate
and reflective senses and suggested that the most promising way is the PIT
approach.
One way to put the view of immediate and reflective senses that I’ve proposed
is this: Representations have immediate senses, which are phenomenal contents.
Some representations, in addition to having immediate senses, are treated as if
they stood for the immediate senses of other representations, which is, roughly,
a matter of having dispositions to accept the immediate senses of those other
representations as equivalent to or further elucidations of their immediate senses.
When we treat a representation as if it stood for the immediate senses of other
representations, those other representations’ immediate senses are its reflective
sense. The end result is a picture on which thoughts and other representational
states provide us two perspectives on the world, an immediate one, one that
is running through our minds, and a derived one, one that is available upon
reflection.22
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